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The various genome sequencing projects of the 1990s were significant in 
providing a first approximation of the core molecular information about the 
genome. They were no less significant for the ways in which they contributed to 
a reconfigured moral imagination and thereby to altering relations among and 
between biology, ethics, and anthropology. 1 From the outset, the genome 
projects and the bio-ethics programs affiliated with them traded on the notion 
that the genome contained the determinative essence of human identity. The 
run up to the announcement of the mapping and eventual sequencing of the 
human genome was replete with the rhetoric of revelation: in reading our DNA 
genomic scientists were uncovering the “blueprint” of life, the “holy grail” of 
biology. Of course, from the outset such rhetoric provoked contestation and 
rebuttal, but even then it was taken seriously and its proponents succeeded in 
setting the points of debate and communication. 2 As such a good deal of 
anthropological and ethical energy was spent working to imagine, understand, 
and critically evaluate the supposed capacities and threats introduced by 
massive genomic sequencing projects.  
 
 
Ethics: Technology snd Equipment 
 
In a major innovation, Federal funds – “the largest ethics project in human 
history” 3 as one actor put it – were devoted to the design and implementation 
of legal and cultural methods, procedures, and practices adequate to the 
challenges posed by the sequencing projects. Like the molecular technologies 
under consideration, these legal and cultural interventions were designed to 
achieve specified ends. 4 We call the specific mode of intervention and its 
standardization “equipment.” In general, what is distinctive about equipment is 
that its task is to connect a set of truth claims, affects, and ethical orientations 
into a set of practices. These practices, which have taken different forms 
historically, are productive responses to changing conditions brought about by 
specific problems, events and general reconfigurations. The first National 
Commission, for example, was established, in part, as response to the abuse of 
research subjects of medical research. The Commission was mandated to 
develop practices by which research subjects could be protected. The form 
these practices took was guided by the following considerations: a truth claim 
(human beings are subjects whose autonomy must be respected), an affect 
(outrage at the abuse of such infamous research projects as the Tuskegee 
experiments), and an ethical orientation (human subjects must be protected 
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from such abuse in future through the guarantee of their free and informed 
consent). With genomics more than the autonomy of subjects appeared to be 
at stake. For many, human nature as well as the integrity of nature more 
generally seemed threatened. Thus the sequencing projects contributed to a 
growing sense that bio-ethics urgently needed new means, designed to protect 
human beings from violations of their nature. Neither the affect of concern nor 
the desire to restrict genetic interventions was new, to be sure. What was new, 
however, was a growing sense that bio-ethics as it functioned in authorized 
spaces, such as government commissions, needed to be recalibrated to meet 
these new conditions. The means of that re-calibration are what we are calling 
“equipment.” 
 
Whereas the protection of research subjects involved the development of 
regulations “upstream” from research in the form of Institutional Review Boards 
and protocols for obtaining informed consent, human genomics appeared to 
require the design of a set of “downstream” practices. The objective of this 
equipment, this pragmatic mode of intervention and regulation, was to mitigate 
“social consequences” by restricting those directions and applications of 
research thought to pose a threat to the dignity of human beings. In the U.S., 
equipment of this kind began to be elaborated as part of the Human Genome 
Initiative ELSI project (ethical, legal, and social implications); it has been most 
thoroughly conceptualized and developed by the current President’s Council on 
Bioethics. The architect and first chair of that Council, Prof. Leon Kass, 
proposed a truth claim, an affect, and an ethical orientation for the construction 
of such equipment: 1) bio-ethics matters precisely because what is at stake in 
biotechnology is humanization or dehumanization, that is to say, the essence of 
human being is on the line; 2) this state of affairs should inspire a measure of 
fear, and vigilance for in the face of scientific advance the “truly” human might 
be sacrificed; and 3) given the risk of dehumanization, the task of the ethicist is 
to discover what is truly valuable about human life in advance of any particular 
scientific endeavor and secure it against scientific excess.5  
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, after two decades of genomics, it is 
now clear that the significance of biology for the formation of human life is more 
than molecular; today we are faced with new forms of the challenge of 
understanding living organisms and their milieus. New developments in the bio-
sciences must be accompanied by the invention of new ethical and 
anthropological analysis and equipment. Focusing on a new synthetic biology 
engineering center with which we are associated, SynBERC, we argue that 
contemporary developments call for new forms of collaboration among ethics, 
anthropology, and biology. Collaboration is a form of engagement appropriate 
to the shared stakes of biological research and the broad assemblages within 
which such research is situated. It is animated by the recognition that ethicists, 
anthropologists, and biologists are working in a shared field of problems. 
Collaboration therefore requires more than observation and advice, more than 
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submission to oversight. Collaboration requires a reflection on and adjustment 
of basic work habits. In this article we propose the initial steps in that direction.  
 
 
Post Genomics: Human Practices 
 
Under the leadership of Professor Kass, the President’s Council was oriented 
by the view that bio-ethics must begin its work by identifying the “defining and 
worthy features of human life” so as to determine whether or not those features 
are put at risk by innovations bio-medical technology. Several characteristics of 
this orientation are noteworthy. First, these features of human life are universal 
and a-historical, that is, they obtain regardless of context or situation. Second, 
this means that they can be identified without reference to scientific 
developments. Third, as such, the defining features of human life serve as 
criteria by which particular scientific programs can be judged as threatening or 
not to “truly human” life.6 
 
When the design of equipment starts with the supposition that science can only 
pose threats to the integrity of human nature, it is difficult for ethical 
understandings of anthropos to take into account the knowledge produced by 
contemporary molecular biology or anthropology. Ethics thereby would be 
positioned exterior to both biological and human sciences. Such positioning 
makes it more difficult to incorporate scientific knowledge in formulating the 
stakes and significance of contemporary human practices. Rather than 
excluding continuing scientific insight from our understanding of the human, it 
seems imperative to engage molecular biology and other sciences in order to 
learn what they can tell us about living beings. If one accepts this dialogic and 
contingent form of engagement, then scientific developments themselves 
prompt the question: are contemporary forms of ethical equipment required 
today? And what critical stance – in the sense of assessing legitimate limits and 
forms – is appropriate toward and within it?  
 
Molecular biology demonstrated that DNA is shared by all forms of life and is a 
remarkably pliable molecule. This means on the one hand that if there are 
questions to be posed about qualitative distinctiveness of living beings – and 
there are – such questions must be posed at a different level than the 
molecular. On the other hand, it suggests that DNA can be manipulated without 
violating any laws of nature or deep ethical principles per se. Longer and longer 
DNA sequences are being constructed ever more efficiently and economically 
each year. Sequences are being inserted with increasingly precision and 
forethought into organisms; knowledge and know-how are accumulating about 
ways to make these organisms function predictably. What is at issue for the 
science, the ethics, and the anthropology is not the metaphysical purity of 
nature but the biological function of DNA sequences, the extent to which these 
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sequences can be successfully redesigned, and ways in which these redesigns 
contribute to – or are nefarious to – well-being understood as a biological, 
anthropological and ethical question.  
 
Living beings are complex in part because of their evolutionary history; they 
survived or perished under specific selective pressure in particular 
environments. Although the products of natural selection demonstrate fitness, 
this does not mean that this is the only way that the organism can function. 
Quite the contrary, while evolution certainly contains lessons about organic 
functionality, for contemporary biologists there is nothing sacred about the 
evolutionary paths followed to arrive at the functionality. Furthermore, the 
specific functions themselves are neither inviolable nor immutable. For 
biologists, there is no ontological or theological reason per se why specific 
functions – whatever their history – cannot be redesigned. Biologists indeed are 
making new things. And while this may not violate any sacrosanct ontology of 
nature, it does not mean that anything goes. It is precisely because we do not 
think that nature is by essence immutable that these practices and the objects 
they produce must be carefully examined. The effects of redesign do contribute 
to a problematization of things (ontology) that must be taken up, thought about, 
and engaged (ethics and anthropology).  
 
In 2007, not only are genomes sequenced with regularity and a steady flow of 
genes inventoried and annotated but an array of other active biological parts 
and functions is being identified and catalogued. All of this science and 
technology proceed on the basis of a tacit faith in a principle of an economy of 
nature. That is to say that nature must consist in isolatable and describable 
units and functions. Many biological functions appear to be irreducibly complex 
in part because the capacities to analyze them, to break them down into parts, 
do not yet exist. One strategy to address this impasse is to invent the skills 
necessary to reconstruct those parts and make them function. It is that path – 
of analysis and synthesis – that is currently being grouped under the rubric 
“synthetic biology” and which concerns us here.  
 
Today, in the early years of post-genomic science, the insufficiency of what has 
been called “the gene-myth” is now clearer. It has not been as frequently 
recognized, however, that the sufficiency of the standard bio-ethical models 
that arose along side the discourse of molecularization must itself be exposed 
to renewed questioning and reformulation. Questioning and reformulation does 
not mean jettisoning; much of existing bio-ethical equipment continues to serve 
a necessary function. It is simply prudent and consistent with our principles for 
those of us inventing new ethical forms based in phronesis to learn from the 
strengths and limits of previous practices. Limiting the intersection among 
ethics, science, and anthropology, however, to either upstream bureaucratic 
review or downstream impact regulation now appears poorly adjusted to the 
current situation of dynamic contingency and critical exploration in the 
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biological and human sciences. In sum, loyalty to past practices can inhibit an 
ability to identify and analyze new challenges. We must take seriously the ways 
in which current transformations in scientific research modulate past problems 
as well as the equipment that had been invented to handle them.  
 
Ethical equipment like that developed by the President’s Council remains in an 
ambivalent relation to bio-scientific innovations. Strikingly absent from the 
development of this equipment is any attempt to incorporate the insights of 
contemporary science into definitions of what it means to be human. We hold 
that bio-ethics, as currently practiced in official settings, tends to undervalue 
the extent to which ethics and science can play a mutually formative role. More 
significant, it undervalues the extent to which science and ethics can 
collaboratively contribute to and constitute a “flourishing existence.” As a 
place-holder, we note here that flourishing is a translation of a classical term 
(eudaemonia) and as such a range of other possible words could be used: 
thriving, the good life, happiness, fulfillment, felicity, abundance and the like.7 
Above all, eudaemonia should not be confused with technical optimization as 
we hold that our capacities are not already known and that we do not 
understand flourishing to be uncontrolled growth or the undirected 
maximization of existing capacities. Here we are merely insisting that the 
question of what constitutes a good life today, and the contribution of the bio-
sciences to that form of life must be vigilantly posed and re-posed. Which 
norms are actually in play and how they function must be observed, chronicled, 
and evaluated in an on-going fashion. It is plausible that engaged observation 
stands a chance of contributing positively to emergent scientific formations. It is 
worth seeing if such observation can be effectively realized by conducting 
ethical inquiry in direct and ongoing collaboration with scientists, policy makers, 
and other stake holders. We are persuaded that within such collaborative 
structures: biology, ethics and anthropology can orient practice to the 
flourishing as both telos and mode of operation.  
 
 
Synthetic Biology 
 
The challenges of functional redesign presented by innovations in molecular 
biology are being addressed by a next generation of “post-genomic” projects. 
One such project is synthetic biology. Synthetic biology began as a visionary 
but minimally defined project:  
 
“Synthetic Biology is focused on the intentional design of artificial 
biological systems, rather than on the understanding of natural 
biology. It builds on our current understanding while simplifying 
some of the complex interactions characteristic of natural 
biology.” “Those working to (i) design and build biological parts, 
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devices and integrated biological systems, (ii) develop 
technologies that enable such work, and (iii) place the scientific 
and engineering research within its current and future social 
context.”8  
 
At the outset, the name was a basically a place-holder, or as some of its critics 
hold, a hoped for brand. Since its chief architects, however, understand 
synthetic biology as a process of modularization and standardization, it appears 
to us to be developing in and renovating a tradition nicely labeled the 
“Engineering Ideal in American Culture.”9 Unlike the visionaries of the 
sequencing projects, and their prophecies of the molecular as the “code of 
codes,” synthetic biologists clearly have a feeling for the organism. 10 Synthetic 
biology aims at nothing less than the (eventual) regulation of living organisms in 
a precise and standardized fashion according to instrumental norms. There is a 
feeling of palpable excitement that biological engineering has the capacity to 
make better living things, although what that would mean beyond efficiency and 
specification opens up new horizons of inquiry and deliberation.  
 
Today, the engineering project of building parts that either embody or produce 
specific biological functions and inserting them in living organisms is at the 
stage of moving from proposal to concept. The concept is being synergistically 
linked to an ever-expanding set of technologies and to increasingly 
sophisticated experimental systems. There is agreement within the synthetic 
biology community that a necessary if not sufficient initial step required to 
further this project is to conceive of, experiment with, organize, and reach 
broad consensus on, standardized measures and processes. The very qualities 
of living systems that make them interesting to engineering—that they are 
robust, complex, and malleable—also make them extremely difficult to work 
with. The extent to which these difficulties can be productively managed 
remains to be seen. In any case, at present hoped-for standards are recognized 
to be initially crude, and will certainly have to be reworked in an ongoing 
manner, but the important step is to begin to create them and to instill an 
awareness and sensitivity among practitioners as to their importance.  
 
Synthetic biology arose once genome mapping became standard, once new 
abilities to synthesize DNA expanded, and once it became plausible to direct 
the functioning of cells. Its initial projects address a part of the global crisis in 
public health – malaria. At the same time, the first ethical concerns that it has to 
deal with arise from the risk of bio-terrorism (see below). The synthetic biology 
community is obliged to bring these heterogeneous elements into a common 
configuration. Put schematically, synthetic biology can be understood as arising 
from, and as a response to, new capacities, new demands, and new difficulties 
that oblige, in an urgent manner, contemporary ways of thinking and 
experimenting with vitality, health, and the functioning of living systems. Those 
investing in the development of synthetic biology expect that it will play a 
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formative role in medicine, security, economics, and energy, and thereby 
contribute to human flourishing. Questions about what constitutes flourishing 
and the extent to which synthetic biology can indeed contribute to it are basic, 
and, more importantly, remain unanswered.  
SYNBERC 
 
In 2006 a group of researchers and engineers from an array of scientific 
disciplines proposed a five year project to achieve such standardization, with 
the aim thereby of rendering synthetic biology a full-fledged engineering 
discipline. Representing five major research universities—UC Berkeley, MIT, 
Harvard, UC San Francisco, and Prairie View A&M—the participants proposed 
to coordinate their research efforts through the development of a collaborative 
research center: the Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center, or, 
SynBERC (www.synberc.org). SynBERC is highly unusual on a number of 
counts. In addition to its far reaching research and technology objectives, it 
represents an innovative assemblage of multiple scientific sub-disciplines, 
diverse forms of funding, complex institutional collaborations, an orientation to 
the near-future looking, intensive work with governmental and non-
governmental agencies, focused legal innovation, imaginative use of media. 
More unusual still, from the start SynBERC has built in ethics as an integral and 
co-equal if distinctive component.  
 
The SynBERC initiative is designed around four core thrusts: Parts, Devices, 
Chasses, and Human Practices. These thrusts, in turn, are designed to meet 
specified goals. Thrusts 1 through 3 link evolved systems and designed 
systems, with emphasis on organizing and refining elements of biology through 
design rules. Thrust 4 examines synthetic biology within a frame of human 
practices. It attends to the ways that synthetic biology may significantly inform 
human well-being through its contributions to medicine, security, energy, and 
the environment. 11 Critical examination of how synthetic biology will inform 
these domains constitutes a central concern of Thrust 4. 
 
Several core synthetic biology projects were well under way prior to the 
organization of SynBERC. Two of these were particularly important for the 
development of Thrusts 1-3. The first is a project at Berkeley, led by SynBERC 
Director Jay Keasling. The project’s goal is to take a molecule, artemesinin, that 
is found in the bark of a Chinese tree, and which is one of a small group of 
molecules that remain effective against malaria, and to engineer a system in 
which the molecule can be produced at a cost that is many times less than the 
extraction from the tree. This basic work has been accomplished – it is grown in 
yeast or e. coli through a re-engineering of the pathways of these common 
single celled organisms. So, synthetic biology, at least in this form, exists and it 
works. The major criticisms of the project come from those who have the 
legitimate concern that too much hope is being invested in a combination 
therapy based on a synthetic version of artemesinin that is likely to lead to its 
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potential over-use and the consequent acceleration of resistance to it, with 
tragic results. That is a valid public health argument and those holding this 
position do not advocate eliminating this source, only thinking about 
consequences. 
 
The partner chosen to take Keasling’s work out of the lab and into those 
regions of the world where it most urgently needed, is another distinctive NGO, 
One World Health. The concept around which this NGO is organized is that 
hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent in research and development in 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries that have yielded scientific 
insight, technical improvements, but often no commercially viable product. 
Their strategy has been to acquire (at the lowest possible cost) the intellectual 
property generated by this investment and work and to transfer it to countries 
like India where it can be adapted to local circumstances. The goal is to make 
available therapeutic advances that might be effective but are deemed to be 
not profitable enough for multi-national pharmaceutical companies. The quid 
pro quo is for those receiving the intellectual property not to compete in the 
same markets. 
 
Although it is hard to imagine how one could argue that one should not 
encourage the development of new anti-malaria drugs in a world in which 
several hundred thousand people die each year from the parasite simply 
because the molecule to be used in therapy would be produced by re-
engineering pathways in yeast or e. coli, this does not mean that no critical 
questioning should go on. But critical questioning requires knowledge and 
understanding. Hence, it is valid to argue that an over-abrupt use of a mono-
therapy in a situation where the pathogen is highly adaptive is not a prudent 
strategy. And the synthetic biologists accept that criticism and are seeking to 
build the molecule so that poly-therapies that will reduce the likelihood of swift 
resistance can be built into the design (artificial, organic, natural, and 
emergent). Surely, changing the genome of yeast to produce artemesinin 
seems prudent and urgent, knowing full well that it is being designed to be 
introduced into the bodies of human beings and will thereby change both their 
internal milieu which already consists of multiple genomes (both contemporary 
and archaic) as well as the external milieu in which they live. 
 
So, perhaps unique attention to the question of existing cultural understandings 
of nature and science at times can obscure other potentially more significant 
problems and questions. For example, what is perhaps most distinctive about 
this project is its funding and institutional setting. There is government research 
money, there is venture capital funding, there is university support, and the 
artemesinin project is funded in large part by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. This foundation – with the gift of massive funding by financier 
Warren Buffet – has the largest endowment of any philanthropy in the world. It, 
like a few other new foundations – Google now has a for-profit foundation – are 
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seeking to assemble health, science, policy, accountability, profit, delivery 
systems, management styles, scope, and timing in a distinctive fashion. Here is 
a very American assemblage with global reach. Its norms of productivity and 
accountability differ from those of the WHO or other such organizations in 
which national and international politics play such a distinctive part. This 
assemblage would certainly seem to be making a difference. And that diagnosis 
implies that we are obliged to think about its significance.  
 
A second important project that was underway prior to SynBERC is located at 
MIT. It is devoted to building, or learning how to build, or to find out to what it 
extent it is possible to build, standardized biological parts, devices, and 
platforms. Its goal is to have a directory of such functional units available for 
order online – www.parts.mit.edu – and to make them available world wide on 
the basis of an open source license developed by a non-profit called Creative 
Commons. The core concept and initial work has taken place at MIT under the 
leadership of Professors Drew Endy and Tom Knight, integral members of the 
SynBERC initiative. One original organizational contribution, led by Randy 
Rettberg, has been to organize an international student competition, iGEM 
(genetically engineered machines) that has grown exponentially over the last 
three years to include the participation of over a hundred teams.12 
 
Whereas one set of ethical and policy problems were raised by the Keasling 
project, the work at MIT poses a different order of challenge. Recent 
innovations in synthesis technology vastly expand the capacity to produce ever 
larger specified sequences of DNA more rapidly, at lower cost, and with greater 
accuracy. These innovations raise the stakes of the so-called “dual-use” 
problem (the idea that technologies can be used both constructively and 
destructively) expanding existing fields of danger and risk. The relation between 
technical innovation and the expansion of danger has long been identified in the 
world of genetic engineering. Previously, these trends have been framed as 
issues of safety, which can be addressed through technical solutions. To date a 
number of reports focusing on the governance of synthetic biology have 
adopted this framing.13 
  
It has become clear, however, that not all challenges associated with synthetic 
biology can be dealt with through technical safeguards. For instance, changes 
associated with contemporary political environments, particularly new potential 
malicious users and uses (i.e. terrorists/terrorism), and increased access to 
know-how through the internet exceed technical questions of safety. Such 
challenges cannot be adequately addressed using existing models of nation-
specific regulation. New political milieus produce qualitatively new problems 
that require qualitatively new solutions. In addition, we must confront the 
challenge of uncertainty characteristic of all scientific research. Although some 
risks are presently understood, we lack frameworks for confronting a range of 
new risks which fall outside of previous categories. Such frameworks would 
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need to be characterized by vigilant observation, forward thinking, and 
adaptation.  
 
Given these conditions, synthetic biology calls for a richer and more sustained 
inquiry and reflection then is possible in a study commission model of 
collaboration, wherein formal interaction ceases with publication of a report. To 
date, work in bio-ethics has largely consisted either of intensive, short term 
meetings aimed at producing guidelines or regulations, or standing committees 
whose purpose is limited to protocol review or rule enforcement. By contrast, 
we are committed to an approach that fosters ongoing collaboration among 
disciplines and perspectives from the outset. The principle goal of SynBERC’s 
Human Practices thrust is to design such collaboration. This enterprise aims at 
giving form to real time reflection on the significance of research developments 
as they unfold and the environments within which research is unfolding. The 
aim of such collaborative reflection would be to identify challenges and 
opportunities in real time, and to redirect scientific, political, ethical, and 
economic practices in ways that would, hopefully, mitigate future problems and 
contribute to human flourishing. 
  
 
Human Practices: Principles of Design 
 
Within collaborative structures, practice can be oriented and re-oriented as it 
unfolds. This work is accomplished not through the prescription of moral 
codes, but through mutual reflection on the practices and relationships at work 
in scientific engagement and how these practices and relationships allow for 
the realization of specified ends. Straightforwardly: ethics and anthropology can 
be designed so as to help us pause, inquire into what is going on, and evaluate 
projects and strategies. The goal of the Human Practices Thrust is to design, 
develop and sustain this mode of collaboration. Given that goal, our wager is 
that the primary challenge for the Human Practices Thrust is the invention of 
diverse forms of equipment requisite for the task. If the scientific aims of 
synthetic biology can be summarized as the effort to make living things better 
and to make better living things, then the principle question that orients our 
efforts to invent contemporary ethical equipment is this: How should complex 
assemblages bringing together a broad range of diverse actors be ordered so 
as to make it more rather than less likely that flourishing will be enhanced?  
 
We do not yet know what form contemporary equipment will take.14 At this 
early stage of our work, however, three fundamental design principles appear 
worthy of elaboration and testing: emergence, flourishing, and remediation. In 
initial experimentation these design principles appear to be both pertinent and 
robust. They are pertinent in that they form part of the research strategies of the 
biologists and characterize the assemblage of relations within which the 
research is developing. Initial indications have shown them to be robust in 
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closely related domains (e.g. bio-security). In these domains they have made 
visible unanticipated problems and interconnections, thereby opening up new 
and more appropriate modes of intervention and reflection. One of our initial 
aims is to test the robustness of these principles in synthetic biology. 
 
Research in human practices is underdetermined. Past bio-ethical practices, 
often operated as though the most significant challenges and problems could 
be known in advance of the scientific work with which these challenges and 
problems were to be associated. Our hypothesis is that such practices are not 
sufficient for characterizing the contemporary assemblage within which 
synthetic biology is embedded. This assemblage is a contemporary one: it is 
composed of both old and new elements and their interactions.15 While some 
of these elements are familiar, the specific form of the assemblage itself, and 
the effects of this form, can only be known as it emerges. We understand 
emergence to refer to a state in which multiple elements combine to produce 
an assemblage, whose significance cannot be reduced to prior elements and 
relations. As such, the problems and their solutions associated with synthetic 
biology cannot be identified and addressed until they unfold. Questions 
concerning what it means to make life different, what it means to make living 
beings better, and what metrics and practices are appropriate to these tasks 
can best be addressed in real time as challenges arise and breakdowns 
happen. The knowledge needed to move toward the desired near-future will be 
developed in a space of relative uncertainty and contingency. Adopting a 
vigilant disposition that is attentive to a mode of emergence is at the core of our 
work. In sum our equipment must be designed such that it generates 
knowledge appropriate to states of emergence.  
 
In the 1990s bio-ethical equipment was designed to protect human dignity, 
understood as a primordial and vulnerable quality. Hence its protocols and 
principles were limited to establishing and enforcing moral bright lines 
indicating which areas of scientific research were forbidden. A different 
orientation, one that follows within a long tradition but seeks to transform it, 
takes ethics to be principally concerned with the care of others, the world, 
things, and ourselves. Such care is pursued through practices, relationships, 
and experiences that contribute to and constitute a flourishing existence 
(eudaemonia). Understood most broadly, flourishing ranges over physical and 
spiritual well-being, courage, dignity, friendship, and justice although the 
meaning of each of these terms must be re-worked and re-thought according 
to contemporary conditions. The question of what constitutes a flourishing 
existence, and the place of science in that form of life, how it contributes to or 
disrupts it, must be constantly posed and re-posed in such a form that its 
realization becomes more rather than less likely. In sum the equipment we are 
developing must be oriented to cultivating forms of care of others, the world, 
things, and of ourselves in such a way that flourishing becomes the mode and 
the telos of both scientific and ethical practice.  
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The third design challenge is to develop equipment that operates in a mode of 
remediation. The term remediation has two relevant facets. First, it means to 
remedy, to make something better. Second, remediation entails a change of 
medium. Together, these two facets provide the specification of a specific 
mode of equipment. When synthetic biology is confronted by difficulties 
(conceptual breakdowns, unfamiliarity, technical blockages, and the like), 
ethical practice must be able to render these difficulties in the form of coherent 
problems that can be reflected on and attended to. That is to say, ethical 
practice remediates difficulties such that a range of possible solutions become 
available. In sum, our challenge is to design contemporary equipment that will 
operate in a mode of remediation. This equipment must be calibrated to 
knowledge of that which is emergent, and enable practices of care which lead 
to flourishing.  
 
We do not presume to know in advance of its actual scientific work how 
synthetic biology will inform human life. We are persuaded, however, that 
ethical observation and anthropological analysis is capable of contributing 
positively to the overall formation of synthetic biology. We think that our 
contribution can only be effectively realized if this work is conducted in direct 
collaboration with scientists, policy makers, and other stake holders. Standard 
approaches have sought to anticipate how new scientific developments will 
impact “society,” and “nature” positioning themselves external to, and 
“downstream” of, the scientific work per se. The value of collaboration is that it 
constitutes a synergistic and recursive structure within which significant 
challenges, problems, and achievements are more likely to be clearly 
formulated, successfully evaluated, and changed. Following our design 
principles, our goal is to invent new sets of contemporary equipment, put it into 
practice, and remediate things as they unfold.  
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NOTES 
1 Thanks to NSF # for funding. To Drew Endy and Jay Keasling. And to all the readers and ARC 
members.  
2 This rhetoric still circulates. A summary statement of the significance of the Human Genome Project 
found on the U.S. National Genome Research Institute website reads, “Completed in April 2003, the 
HGP gave us the ability to, for the first time, to read nature's complete genetic blueprint for building a 
human being.” http://www.genome.gov/10001772  
3 Eric Juengst. 
4 On the concept equipment: Michel Foucault 1977-8 and 1981-2 courses. Paul Rabinow French 
Modern: Norms and Forms of Modern Equipment, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. For 
more on the technical meaning of “equipment” in ethics, see the Anthropology of the Contemporary 
Research Collaboratory at www.anthropos-lab.net.  
5 See http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/jan02/jan17session1.html  
6 Find at www.bioethics.gov  
7 We will address these issues at more length in another article.  
8 http://conference.syntheticbiology.org:  
9 The phrase is from Pauly, P. 1987. Controlling Life. Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in 
Biology. Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. 
10 Hood and Kevles, The Code of Codes, Keller, A Feel for the Organism 
11 For more details see www.synberc.org. This article only treats the efforts of the fundamental 
modules of Thrust 4.  
12 See http://parts2.mit.edu/wiki/index.php/Jamboree  
13 Sloan report, Fink report.  
14 For more on the technical meaning of “equipment” in ethics, see the Anthropology of the 
Contemporary Research Collaboratory at www.anthropos-lab.net.  
15 For more on this technical use of the term “contemporary” see ARC.  
